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If one were to say that freedom of speech has only the scope that those in
power intend it should have then, it may well be asked, has there ever
been-in ancient times or the present, in China or outside of it-a state in
which speech has not been "free"? If we were to proceed along this line
of reasoning, would not our sacred constitutional provision of freedom of
speech become nothing more than the most senseless, empty words?
-From a wall poster at Peking Univer-
sity, December, 1980*
Introduction
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) guaran-
tees China's citizens a full panoply of speech rights.1 Yet recent events
have caused both domestic and foreign observers to wonder whether
these guaranties have any substance. Shortly after the highly publi-
cized trial of the dissident author and editor Wei Jingsheng in October,
1979, and the ensuing crackdown on political dissent,2 "Democracy
Wall ' 3 was stripped and its use as a forum for "big-character posters"
(dazibao) was prohibited. These events were only a prelude. In June,
1980, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China recom-
mended that the National People's Congress remove the "Four Big
Rights" (sida)-the citizens' rights to "speak out freely, air their views
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1982.
* Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Chinese materials are by the author.
1. Under Article 45 of the Chinese Constitution, "[clitizens enjoy freedom of speech,
correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and the freedom
to strike ... ." XiANFA (Constitution) art. 45 (China).
2. Wei Jingsheng was the editor of, and a major contributor to the dissident journal
TANsuo (EXPLORATIoNs), a leading publication during the 1978-79 period of open political
debate that has since come to be known as the "Beijing Spring." See text accompanying
note 39 infra. Wei's trial and sentencing themselves became subjects of criticism and dis-
sent. Attempts to sell transcripts of the trial served as the basis for arrests. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1979, at A7, col. 1; Id., Nov. 13, 1979, at A5, col. 1.
As late as spring, 1981, dissenters of the 1978-79 period were still being arrested and de-
tained by public security personnel. (The public security function in China is roughly
equivalent to a police function.) See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1981, at A5, col. 1.
3. "Democracy Wall" (xidan qiang) is a wall several hundred feet long, located on a
major boulevard in the city of Beijing. After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the
wall became a medium for the expression of Chinese opinion. Most people put up big-
character posters; others went to the wall to distribute materials or to address the crowd.
The posters, pamphlets, and speeches covered a wide range of subjects, from pleas for more
democracy to complaints about the leaders of specific work units. See generally 3. SEY-
MOUR, THE Fn=ra MODERNIZATION 12 (1980).
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fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters"-from Arti-
cle 45 of the Constitution, and, in August, 1980, the Congress dutifully
abolished them.
These events suggest that there is little room for freedom of speech in
China; that the constitutional guaranties are mere words; and that those
words can be removed from the Chinese Constitution at the discretion
of the authorities.4 Yet these events were more than unrelated in-
stances of the exercise of political power; they were crucial to the au-
thorities' attempt to define the role that speech plays in Chinese society.
This Comment will examine this role and assess its appropriateness in
the Chinese political and social context.
The authorities' recent actions must be examined against the back-
ground of the political-legal universe of post-1949 China. That back-
ground contains theoretical and practical elements that lend a
superficial cogency to official explanations of the current restrictions on
speech rights. But it also suggests alternative approaches to the
problem.
Alternative definitions of the role of speech have appeared during
the political history of the People's Republic and in recent writings by
Chinese legal scholars. At present, China's leaders give cursory atten-
tion to the values that these alternatives embody. If there is to be any
hope for the development of free speech doctrine and the expansion of
speech rights in China,5 China's authorities must begin to grant these
values their full weight.
Foreign governments, as well as the P.R.C., have adopted policies
that minimize international scrutiny of Chinese government actions in
the area of civil liberties. The United States, for example, has placed
improved relations with China before concern for human rights.6 The
4. The "current authorities" refers to the current Party leadership, as opposed to judicial
or elected authorities. Though the principle of judicial independence (dull shenpan) is part
of the present Chinese conception of the role of law, the content of legal concepts responds
to fluctuating political imperatives. It can be assumed, for example, that the Party was the
main initiator of the legal proceedings against Wei Jingsheng, just as it was the Party's Cen-
tral Committee whose "recommendation" that the "Four Big Rights" be deleted from the
Constitution was duly adopted by the obedient national legislature. Cf. F. SCHURMANN,
IDEOLOGY AMD ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 188 (2d ed. 1970) ("[O]ne can argue
that the Party, in effect, has displaced the system of law as the third arm of the State.") See
generally Leng, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China" Some Preliminary Observations, 87
CHINA Q. 458-61 (1981).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "China" and "Chinese" are used in this Com-
ment to refer to mainland China after 1949.
6. The Carter administration-an administration that was, at least rhetorically, commit-
ted to furthering human rights-ignored the argument that the process of normalizing rela-
tions with China should have been linked to the lack of due process and civil liberties in that
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Chinese contribute to the world community's neglect of China's rights
practices. At the United Nations, China, a party neither to the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights nor to-the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, has been quiet on questions about human
rights.7 At home, the government periodically denounces "bourgeois"
human rights concepts, and makes clear its belief that such concepts
have little relevance in China.8 The authorities also obstruct foreign-
ers' attempts to study China's legal system, view prisons, and make
contact with dissidents.9 On publishing unflattering material, foreign
reporters have lost favor with the Chinese.' 0
Chinese policy runs against the pull of external relations." As the
scope of China's international activity expands, China may find its
trading partners "linking" important economic and political decisions
to human rights considerations. By denouncing the deplorable state of
civil liberties that existed in China during the Cultural Revolution, and
by launching a "socialist legality" campaign,' 2 the current authorities
have themselves invited attention to the subjects of due process and
civil rights in China.
Accordingly, this Comment is addressed in part to the prospect of a
dialogue between China and the rest of the world. Familiarity with the
Chinese political vocabulary and comprehension of the Chinese con-
ception of rights will diminish the possibility that such a dialogue will
result in a battle of broad clichs: the ability to evaluate China in
China's own language will enhance the prospects for communication.
I. Toward a Functional Definition of "Rights" in China
Readers trained in the American legal system might well be struck
by the apparent ease with which the "Four Big Rights" were removed
from the Chinese Constitution. What kind of "rights" are -rights that
can so readily be abolished? The following discussion, which attempts
to convey the meaning of the Chinese term "right" (quanli) in the Chi-
country. See Cohen, Due Process?, in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE 237, 251 (R. Terrill ed.
1979).
7. Id. at 249-50.
8. Id. at 251.
9. See generally Eliasoph & Grueneberg, Law on Display in China, 88 CHINA Q. 669
(1981).
10. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1981, at A17, col. 1.
11. See Butterfield, Scholars Turn a Colder Eye on Chinese Repression, N.Y. Times, Dec.
6, 1981, § 4 (Week in Review), at 11, coL 3.
12. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
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nese context, argues that the term is a "false friend" of the English
word "right."
A. Rights and the Chinese Constitution
1. Constitutional Theory
The following is a brief sketch of the constitutional theory that un-
derlies the alternative Chinese conceptions of rights. It presents the
tenets of a legal milieu in which the constitution is viewed as a practical
tool.
a. The presumption of consensus
Provisions concerning rights appear in Chapter III of the Chinese
Constitution, "The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens." The
two preceding chapters are: "I. General Principles" and "II. The
Structure of the State." In the Chinese Constitution, as in the constitu-
tions of other socialist countries, 13 theory, governmental and economic
organization, and the role of citizens form an organic whole. Citizens
do not retain rights against the State; rather, the interests of the State
and its citizens are viewed as one. 14 This should not be surprising. The
framers of the Chinese Constitution embraced the theory that all own-
ership is by the people, all State power is wielded by the people, and
the government exists, simply, as an expression of the people's will.15
In such a State, the relationship between the government and the
governed ipsofacto must be one of consensus, not of conflict. This rea-
soning underlies much of the public discussion of Chinese legal theory
and legal policy.
Of course, Chinese theorists recognize that the presumption of con-
13. See, e.g., KoNsTrrTUTs (Consiitution) (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); CON-
sTrr cION (Constitution) (Cuba); ALKOTMANY (Constitution) (Hungary).
14. By contrast, the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution constitutes the second part of
what is in a sense a bipartite document. The constitutional text itself presents a scheme of
government, and the Bill of Rights enumerates the rights of the people as distinct from that
scheme of government. The Ninth Amendment in particular embodies the principle that the
government possesses only its enumerated powers, while all other rights and freedoms previ-
ously enjoyed by the citizens are to be retained by them.
Hence, the proscriptive aspect of most of the amendments constituting the Bill of Rights:
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shallmake no law.... .") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST.
amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure. . . shallnot be violated. .. ") (emphasis
added); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer. . . ") (emphasis ad-
ded). In contrast, the rights provisions of the Chinese, Soviet, and other socialist constitu-
tions, neither prescribe nor proscribe, but rather purport to describe objectively the rights
enjoyed by citizens in those socialist societies.
15. Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution reads "[all power in the People's Republic of
China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise state power are
the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels." XIANFA




sensus cannot be carried too far. The laws of contradiction (maodun)
may cause conflicts between the leaders and the led;16 improper imple-
mentation of Party policies, or an incorrect style of Party leadership,
may create rifts between the Party and the masses;' 7 and imperfections
in democratic processes may produce inadequate political representa-
tion of the electorate.' 8 Reliance on the presumption of consensus nev-
ertheless is a commonplace of Chinese ideology and is particularly
evident in discussions about modifying the Constitution.' 9 The full sig-
nificance of the presumption of consensus appears when the Chinese
Constitution is amended and in the context of the ideological impetus
for change. 20
b. The expectation of change2'
Chinese dialectical and historical materialist analysis2 2 denies that a
constitution (which in Chinese eyes mirrors the relations among social
classes) can possess transcendent validity. This denial derives from the
following assumptions. First, the balance of the class forces in any
given society is constantly shifting. A major shift in the balance makes
revolution possible. But even after the revolution, classes still exist and
16. See generaly MAo ZEDONG, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
People, in FouR ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY 79 (1968).
17. See generally, J. STARR, CONTDIUIG THE REVOLUTION 78-86 (1979). See also Liu
& Niu, The Party Must Lead the Masses of People to be Masters of Their Own House, Red
Flag, Dec. 16, 1980, reprinted in CHINA REPORT, Feb. 23, 1981, at 12 (published by Joint
Publications Research Service).
18. See Liu & Niu, supra note 17, at 13-14.
19. See notes 29-30 and 4ccompanying text infra.
20. In contemporary China,
[c]hange and not stability is regarded as the normal state. In dialectical terms, originat-
ing from Hegelian and Marxist philosophy as well as from Taoist thought, everything
by definition has an opposite. These 'contradictions' (or thesis and antithesis) are in
constant interaction with each other, and their continual resolution produces a synthe-
sis, which in turn continues to interact with its opposite to produce further change....
[Thus] it should not be surprising that Western-style law, which supposes stability and
restrains change, has not fared well in the People's Republic of China. That kind of law
is too conservatizing in the philosophical sense of denying change as the normal and
preferred state.
V. Li, LAW Wrr ouT LAWYERS 4 (1978).
21. See generally Cohen, supra note 6, at 240-43 (discussing differences between the
1954, 1975, and 1978 Constitutions).
22. "Chinese dialectical and historical materialism" refers to the Marxist-inspired polit-
ical philosophy that Chinese thinkers, and Mao in particular, developed in the course of
organizing the Communist Party of China, leading the Chinese revolution, and establishing
the People's Republic. Chinese writers often credit Mao with having taken the best, most
useful elements of Marxism, and adapting those elements to China's unique situation. See
F. ScsuRMANN, supra note 4, at 26. The basic elements of the theory are the unity of the
law of opposites, the theory of class struggle, and the theory of proletarian revolution and
proletarian dictatorship. See id. For a discussion of the application of Chinese dialectical
and historical materialism to society and politics, see J. STAnn, supra note 17, at 34, 39-43.
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their relationships change as society progresses through its socialist
phase toward the realization of Communism. Second, a constitution
can reflect the balance of class forces only at the time it is drafted; it
cannot be read as fixing terms and apportioning powers for eternity.
Therefore, if it is truly to reflect social reality, a constitution must con-
stantly be revised in response to changing conditions.23 And, insofar as
the constitution is subject to revision, the people's rights and duties are
subject to modification.
Such modification poses less theoretical difficulty than might be ex-
pected. In the Chinese view, rights exist only as powers exercised by
individuals within a shifting social framework. The idea that there ex-
ists such a thing as "inalienable rights" is a bourgeois delusion.24 No-
tions about such things as moral values, social roles, and individual
rights, being merely part of the superstructure, evolve in response to
changes in the economic base. For example, some of the moral values
of feudalism might be regarded as evils from the viewpoint of bour-
geois society. Similarly, "inviolable rights" said to exist under capital-
ism are revealed to be illusory or at least unnecessary when a socialist
system comes into being.25
23. According to the Chinese view,
[i]n a single country, during different historical periods, and as a result of changes in the
balance of class forces, the constitution continuously changes and develops. For exam-
ple, China's 1954 Constitution was a constitution of the transitional period, reflecting
the balance of the class forces. It stipulated that China's chief task during the transi-
tional period was the progressive realization of the nation's socialist industrialization
and the progressive socialist reform of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist
industry and ommere ... . Similarly, China's new [1978] constitution is the funda-
mental law of the new period of socialist revolution and socialist construction that
China's people have achieved since the time of the State's founding. . . . Mhe dicta-
torship of the proletariat [has been] consolidated to an unprecedented extent, and [has]
entered into a new period of development. China's new constitution has been drawn up
to meet precisely the needs of this new period.
HUBEI RENMIN CHUBANSHE (HUBEI PEOPLE'S PUBLISHING HousE), ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO XIANFA JIANGHUA (LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA) 13-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LECTURES ON THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTION].
24. To fix a law or a right for all time would be to make an analytical error, and to fall
prey to the bourgeois myth of a "natural law." See R. SCHLESINGER, SovIET LEGAL THE-
oRY 22 (2d ed. 1951); Zhu, Correcty Understand and Exercise the Right to Freedom of
Speech, Workers' Daily, Mar. 16, 1981, reprinted in DAILY REP., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (FBIS), Mar. 30, 1981, at L12.
25. In this regard, Chinese writers cite the following passage from Stalin:
Capitalist constitutions are frequently limited to the stipulation of the formal rights of
citizens: they pay no attention to the conditions for the realization of those rights, the
possibility that those rights could be realized, or the mechanisms for their realization.
They emptily talk about the equality of citizens, ignoring the fact that, while the capital-
ists and landowners possess the wealth and the political power in society, the workers
and peasants have none; and that, while the capitalists and landowners are exploiters,
the workers and peasants are the exploited; so that factory bosses and workers, land-




The historical materialist interpretation of "bourgeois rights" regards
those rights as the worthless tokens individuals in capitalist societies
receive in exchange for giving up what alone truly is their right: the
right to control the means of production and the disposition of what is
produced. Because socialist revolution returns this fundamental right
to the people, the other rights, which are merely formal when held by
the citizens of capitalist countries, can begin to take on reality and sub-
stance only in a socialist milieu.26 To regard such rights as inalienable
would disregard their ultimate dependence on changes in the economic
base, changes that determine the extent to which rights can be realized
and enjoyed. In view of this dependence, the importance of rights and
the scope to be afforded their exercise must, according to the Chinese,
remain unsettled.
2. The Removal of the "Tour Big Rights"from the Chinese
Constitution
The deletion of the "Four Big Rights" from the Chinese Constitution
must be viewed in the context of this political and constitutional theory.
Rather than an isolated assertion of authority, it is just one constitu-
tional modification that has taken place during the brief history of the
People's Republic of China. The P.R.C. adopted its first Constitution
in 1954. Its two successors, the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions, have each
incorporated several modifications. The "Four Big Rights" were them-
selves one such change, appearing for the first time in the 1975
Constitution.27
In contrast to the process of amending the U.S. Constitution, the pro-
cedures for modifying the Chinese Constitution are neither open to the
of speech, assembly and publication, forgetting that, because the workers can't possibly
have suitable meeting places, good printing presses, adequate supplies of paper, etc.,
these freedoms are, to the working classes, nothing more than empty words.
J. STALIN, LECTURES ON LENImISM 42-43 (1965).
26. The new Chinese constitution
is a socialist constitution which not only provides every fundamental right of citizens
but, what is even more important, also provides the material safeguards for the realiza-
tion of those rights. Thanks to China's socialist system, the laboring masses have cast
unemployment and poverty aside; and, moreover, due to the continuous expansion of
socialist production, there is an ever more complete material basis for the progressive
improvement of the people's material and cultural lives. Because of this, the funda-
mental rights which the new Constitution provides have a reliable material guaranty.
As the dictatorship of the proletariat is continuously consolidated and strengthened,
and the work of socialist construction swiftly expands, China's people will be able to
enjoy these rights even more fully.
LECTURES ON THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 123.
27. The "Four Big Rights" made their constitutional debut in Article 13 of the "General
Principles" chapter of the 1975 Constitution, which provided that "[the 'Four Big Rights']
are new forms of socialist revolution [which have been] created by the people. The state
safeguards the masses' use of these forms." XIANFA (Constitution) of 1975 (China).
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electorate's scrutiny nor subject to its influence. The Party Central
Committee recommends changes and the National People's Congress
adopts them in the course of promulgating a new version of the Consti-
tution. The deletion of the "Four Big Rights" was unique and obtru-
sive only in that the change took place just after the 1978 Constitution
had been ratified.
28
In publicizing the Central Committee's recommendation that the
"Four Big Rights" be removed from the Constitution, the Chinese
press relied on the presumption of consensus, 29 publishing a spate of
articles describing the masses' enthusiastic approval of the recommen-
dation.30 Analysis of the event, both in the press and in legal periodi-
cals, took the following form. The "Four Bigs" are forms of political
expression that appeared in China prior to the Cultural Revolution.31
Their use reached its height during the Cultural Revolution, a time of
great ideological ferment and mass political activism. Indeed, at that
time the "Four Bigs" played such a significant role that they came to be
28. But note that there were early indications of disagreement among the leadership as
to the status of the "Four Big Rights." Ye Jianying's "Report on the Revision of the Consti-
tution," issued on March 1, 1978, contained an ambiguous passage regarding the inclusion
of the "Four Big Rights" in Article 45.
It is precisely for the purpose of ensuring great democracy under the leadership of the
proletariat that the draft of the revised Constitution provides that citizens have [the
"Four Big Rights"]. The "gang of four" waved the banner of great democracy to op-
pose the leadership of the Party and the proletariat. . . . Such "great democracy"
would mean a vengeful comeback of the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionar-
ies and bad elements, and an anti-Party and anti-socialist rightist coup .... Isn't it fair
and just for the broad masses to reject that kind of "great democracy"? Chairman Mao
long ago said, "[tY anyone resorts to what he calls great democracy to oppose the socialist
system and try to overthrow the leadersh&p of the Communist Party, we shall exercise the
dictatorshp of the proletariat over him."
YE JIANYING, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprintedin FOREIGN LAN-
GUAGES PRESS, DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 188-90 (1978) (emphasis added).
29. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
30. See Quxiao 's ida"fuhe dangxin shunying minyl, Beijing Daily, Mar. 3, 1980 (aboli-
tion of the 'Four Bigs' accords with the wishes of the Party and responds to the people's
desires); Quxiao 'rid" hehu minxin, People's Daily, Mar. 10, 1980 (abolition of the 'Four
Bigs' accords with the people's wishes); Quxiao '"ida"fuhe quanguo renminyi uan, People's
Daily, Enlightenment Daily, and Beijing Daily, Apr. 15, 1980 (abolition of the 'Four Bigs'
accords with the wishes of all the nation's people). Notice that the verb used in all of the
headlines is "quxiao," which means "abolish" or "obliterate." Actually, the "Four Bigs"
were not "abolished" by this decision, in the sense of being made illegal; all that was done
was to deny constitutional protection to their exercise. But such headlines implied that the
"Four Bigs" were to be abolished, not only as rights, but also as permissible forms of
expression.
31. Some commentators noted that big-character posters were used during the "Anti-
Rightist" campaign of 1957. See Dircussing Big-Character Posters, 5 MINZHU YU FAZHI 15,
16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DEMOCRACY AND LAW]; The "Four Bigs"Are Not Good
Methods For Realizing Socialist Democracy, Enlightenment Daily, Apr. 2, 1980. But see J.
SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 5-6 (suggesting that the use of wall posters in post-1949 China
was "never truly free" from official control until the winter of 1978-79).
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enshrined in the Constitution. But now that the Cultural Revolution
has ended and China emphasizes the orderly development of the econ-
omy instead of mass political campaigns, these "great democratic"
modes of expression are no longer as significant as they were. Quite the
contrary. Because their exercise disrupts social order, zealous exercise
of the "Four Bigs" could impede progress towards the goal of this new
era, the realization of the Four Modernizations.
32
Other reasons adduced in support of abolishing the "Four Big
Rights" made it clear that not only are the "Four Bigs" no longer to be
constitutionallyprotected forms of political expression; the authorities
actually disapprove their exercise.
The "Four Bigs," commentators noted, were misused during the Cul-
tural Revolution. The "Four Bigs," according to the authorities, were
used by "bad people"-Wei Jingsheng, for example-to stir up dissent,
foment factionalism, and encourage anarchy. Big-character posters
were even used to leak state secrets. Many good people suffered slan-
derous attacks, while their attackers remained anonymous. Mass criti-
cism campaigns ruined lives and reputations. Critics also noted the
lack of personal responsibility and legal accountability associated with
the "Four Bigs," and the absence of opportunities for victims of poster
campaigns to respond to the charges against them. The "great debates"
of the Cultural Revolution, some observers pointed out, often were uni-
lateral attacks in the service of a personal vendetta, rather than real
debates.
33
These criticisms may have some validity. But they fall far short of
being a thorough evaluation of the "Four Bigs" and their effects.
"Slandering individuals" and "causing trouble" were not the only pur-
poses of wall posters. Using posters created open fora in a society in
which few people have access to the public media or to any private
means of disseminating their views.34 Some posters addressed major
political problems.35 Others, such as those that demanded review of
specific cases or expressed desires to change jobs or residences, focused
on the problems of individuals.36 Aggrieved citizens, who reasonably
32. The "Four Modernizations" (sige xiandaihua) campaign, which began at the end of
the Cultural Revolution, aims for the modernization of agriculture, industry, defense, and
science and technology by the year 2000.
33. See notes 30-31 supra; The Four BigsAre.41 Empty, 3 DImocRAcY AND LAW, supra
note 31, at 22 (1980).
34. See generall J. SEYMoUR, supra note 3, at 251; The "4pril F'fh Forum' Story,
SPEAHRHEAD, Winter 1980-81, at 1, 24-25.
35. See J. SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 11-12.
36. See Gelatt, The Limits to Free Speech in China, Asian Wall St. J., June 10, 1980, at 2,
col. 6.
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feared retaliation from officials or bosses,37 and who lacked access to a
judicial forum,38 may have found that their only recourse was anony-
mously to write a big-character poster in the hope that someone would
read it and take heed. Finally, in their most recent, dramatic and noto-
rious use, the wall posters of the 1978-79 "Beijing Spring" period of
open dissent called for democracy and human rights. 39 This latter de-
velopment was undoubtedly the main object of critics' references to
"factionalism" and "anarchy."
The authorities did not feel obliged to undertake, or to allow, a more
searching inquiry into the reasons for the removal of the "Four Big
Rights" from China's Constitution. Such an inquiry might well have
led to arguments more principled and compelling than the ones ad-
vanced. The literature on the subject, for example, alluded to the fact
that much of the supposedly "spontaneous" exercise of the "Four
Bigs," particularly during the Cultural Revolution, seems to have been
mass activity orchestrated by powerful Party members.40 This issue
undoubtedly is sensitive for the current leadership, many of whom
were in the "wrong" faction when the "great debates" of that period
took place.41 Nonetheless, the delicacy of the question should not have
foreclosed inquiry into why and how the "Four Big Rights" became
tools of certain Party officials who mobilized the masses, like private
armies, to fight their battles for them. After all, the exercise in other
countries of the rights to demonstrate, hold mass meetings, and post
posters does not inevitably result in ideological warfare and the ruina-
tion of people's lives.
This line of inquiry might well have resulted in the much-needed
discussion of some more fundamental questions: what kind of "democ-
racy" does China need and is China ready for? During the Cultural
Revolution China conducted a unique experiment in mass par-
ticipatory democracy. The "Four Big Rights" were forms of political
expression integral to this experiment. They were, in fact, described in
the 1975 Constitution as "new forms of carrying on socialist revolution
37. The power of factory bosses and unit leaders to make workers' lives miserable is
legendary. It is summed up in the Chinese phrase "gel wo xiao xiezic huan." ("He gives me
small shoes to wear.")
38. Legal facilities are scarce, and access is limited. See Li, Law, in HUMANISTIC AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN CHINA 163, 164-65 (1980).
39. See generally J. SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 7-21.
40. Numerous examples of this phenomenon can be found in the indictment filed in the
recent "Gang of Four" trial. See Trial of Lin-Jiang Cliques.- Indictment of the Special
Procuratorate, 48 BEIJING REV. 9 (1980).
41. Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang are among those members of the current leader-
ship who were publicly criticized. They were, in fact, paraded through the streets wearing
dunce caps during the Cultural Revolution. See Butterfield, The Pragmatists Take Chna's




created by the masses." 42 The current Chinese view is that this experi-
ment in mass democracy was a failure. But, granting arguendo the cor-
rectness of that evaluation, what were the reasons for the failure? Was
it primarily due to mistakes made by Party leaders? Or was it due,
rather, to the fact that the masses are at present incapable of the re-
sponsible and effective exercise of democratic rights?
These are difficult questions, and it is not surprising that the authori-
ties should have been loath to address them. It is particularly unlikely
that, when new leaders are attempting to consolidate their power fol-
lowing the "downfall of the Gang of Four," they would favor public
scrutiny of the intra-Party struggles that led to abuses of the "Four
Bigs." Nevertheless, the skewed and self-serving arguments offered to
justify removing the "Four Big Rights" from the Constitution appar-
ently did not persuade the public.43 The Chinese citizenry were more
impressed by the government's zig-zag: in the fall of 1979 the authori-
ties encouraged the exercise of the "Four Big Rights, 44 only to sup-
press their exercise and delete them from the Constitution a year later.
.The parallel with the "Hundred Flowers" campaign of 1956-57 and its
successor "Anti-Rightist" 45 movement is unmistakable.
46
Despite official discouragement, use of the "Four Bigs" nonetheless
has continued.47 It seems that, at least for some, they have become
42. See note 27 supra.
43. See Tokyo TVReports on Student Unrest in Beling, DAILY REP., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (FBIS), Mar. 23, 1981, at L20 (translation of the transcript of a Tokyo NHK
television network broadcast reporting on the "spontaneous" protest movement that began
at Beijing University in September, 1981, in response to the deletion of the "Four Big
Rights" from the Constitution).
44. See J. SEYMOUR, supra note 3, at 12-13.
45. The "Hundred Flowers" campaign, a brief, dynamic period of relatively free artistic
and literary expression, began in May, 1956, with Mao's injunction to "[1]et a hundred
flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" (baihua qfang baffia zhengming).
This sudden renaissance of debate, expression, and criticism quickly ended, however, with
the June, 1957 publication of Mao's speech entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradic-
tions Among the People." The speech contains, inter alia, a list of "political criteria" for
distinguishing illegitimate from legitimate criticism; Le., a list of guidelines for speech. See
MAO ZEDON G, supra note 16, at 119-20. Soon thereafter an "Anti-Rightist" campaign was
launched. Many people who had criticized the Party and the government during the Hun-
dred Flowers movement were in turn criticized and punished, and the movement was broad-
ened to encompass other "rightists" as well-members of the procuracy, technicians,
"bourgeois intellectuals," people who were thought to have close connections with foreign-
ers, and so on. Thousands lost their jobs and were sent to labor reform camps. See generally
R. MACFARQUHAR, THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLECTU-
ALS (1960). The stigma of having been branded a "rightist" during this period tainted not
only the individual, but his or her entire family as well, for years thereafter.
46. But see Dreyer, Limits of the Permissible in China, PROB. OF COMMUNISM, Nov.-
Dec., 1980, at 64 ("Despite these fears, the actions of the government thus far amount to a
modification of recent policies rather than the precipitous reversal witnessed in 1957.")
47. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1980, at A2, col. 3 (reporting on student campaigns for the
December, 1980 local people's congress elections).
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important modes of political expression. And even if they are not con-
stitutionally protectedper se, their proper exercise is still arguably pro-
tected by the more generally phrased constitutional guaranties of
"freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association,
procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike." If this is indeed
the case, then the ultimate fate of the "Four Bigs" will depend on the
scope afforded the exercise of those rights.48
3. The Unity of the People's Rights and Duties (renmin de quanli he
yiwu deyizhixing)
At present, "the unity of the people's rights and duties" determines
the scope of democratic rights in China. Any prediction or assessment
must confront this principle and its implications.
a. Constitutional theory
Chapter III of the Chinese Constitution ("The Fundamental Rights
and Duties of Citizens") enumerates the rights and duties of Chinese
citizens. This constitutional structure embodies the notion that those
rights and duties are inseparable.49
The notion derives from the same assumptions that produce the pre-
sumption of consensus. Socialist, as opposed to capitalist, countries are
said to be wholly owned by the people and governed, through the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, in the interests of the people. Thus, people
living in a socialist system are truly "masters of their own house"
(dangiia zuozhu)50 and, like any mature proprietors, are willing to un-
dertake duties necessary to the effective, responsible governance of
their establishment. China's Constitution reflects this willingness.
b. Implications of the theoryfor the practice of rights
One might expect the principle of "the unity of the people's rights
and duties" to serve only as a general reminder that the citizens' exer-
cise of democratic rights helps them become better able to perform the
duties owed the state, and vice versa. Recent developments,5' however,
run counter to this view. What follows is a brief exposition of the rela-
48. For a similar view, see Gelatt, supra note 36.
49. This principle of socialist political theory has been made explicit in Article 59 of the
Soviet Constitution. "The exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the perform-
ance by the citizen of his duties." KoNsTrrTrSI (Constitution) art. 59 (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics).
50. See LECTURES ON THE CHINESE CONSTrrTION, supra note 23, at 123-24. Cf. Liu &
Niu, supra note 17 (the Party, which has to some extent become divorced from the masses, is
not serving the people properly).




tionship between rights and duties that these developments seem to
require.
The rights and duties enumerated in the Constitution must be under-
stood to inform each other in more than a merely theoretical way.
True, the exercise of rights may help citizens become better able to per-
form their duties; but perhaps more important is the requirement that
their exercise not transgress the limitations imposed by those duties. The
proper relationship between rights and duties may in fact be summa-
rized as follows: the exercise of rights must increase the citizen's ability
to perform the duties owed the State. Any exercise of rights which vio-
lates this principle is not really an exercise of rights, but rather an in-
stance of failure to "abide by the Constitution and the law."52
This reasoning has significant implications. In any given situation a
person must determine what constitutes appropriate action by weighing
the benefit to be gained from exercising a right against the chance that
the performance of a duty will thereby be disrupted.5 3 To exercise
rights irresponsibly is to shirk the obligation to perform this calculus,
and thus may be tantamount to turning against the State.
54
The constitutional duties that bear most directly on the exercise of
democratic rights derive from Articles 56 and 57 of the Chinese Consti-
tution. Article 56 provides that "[c]itizens must support the leadership
52. Id. According to one Chinese commentator,
[t]he Constitution of our country stipulates rights such as freedom of speech. It also
stipulates that citizens have the obligation to 'support the leadership of the Communist
Party of China and the Socialist system, safeguard the unity of the motherland and
unite all nationalities. Therefore opinions which are antiparty and antisocialist and
which sabotage the unity of the motherland and the nationalities must be prohibited.'
By doing so we are uniting the citizens' rights with their obligations, and in no way have
infringed upon the citizens' freedom of speech.
Zhu, supra note 24, at L15.
53. Cf. id. ("Every conscientious socialist citizen should not only spontaneously restrain
his opinions and abide by the laws and the regulations of 'the Constitution,' but should also
measure himself against socialist morality and 'restrain his opinion.' ")
54. This is not to suggest a legal obligation to perform the duties owed the State. Nor,
on the other hand, does there seem to be any form of legal guaranty for the exercise -of
rights. Though Article 55 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right
"to appeal to organs of state at any level against any infringement of their rights," in all
likelihood this right is not enforceable in a court of law. See Gelatt, Legal Profession and
Lawyers Start to Reemerge in China, Asian Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1980, at 9, col. I ("Jt]he
Chinese conception of a legal system has never embraced the notion of citizens' actions
against the state"). Also note that, whereas a provision guaranteeing to China's citizens
material compensation for infringements of their rights appeared in the 1954 Constitution,
such a provision does not appear in the present version of the Constitution.
This lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the citizens' rights and obligations can
easily result in blurred distinctions between the failure to perform a duty owed the State and
the commission of a crime. See text accompanying notes 96-103 infra, Cf. Ginsburgs &
Pomorski, 4 Profile of the Soviet Constitution of 1977, in F. FELDBRUGGE, THE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND aE UNION REPuBLICS 53-54 (1979) (possible legal conse-
quences of the emphasis upon the "unity of rights and duties").
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of ihe Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, safe-
guard the unification of the motherland and the unity of all nationali-
ties in our country and abide by the Constitution and the law."55
Article 56 requires the citizens to "take care of and protect public prop-
erty, observe labour discipline, observe public order, respect social eth-
ics and safeguard state secrets."
'56
During the year that witnessed the rise and fall of the "Beijing
Spring" dissident movement, 57 the authorities saw fit to derive two new
"duties" from Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Article l's state-
ment that "[t]he People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the
dictatorship of the proletariat ' 58 means, the authorities announced,'
that the people have a duty to "uphold the dictatorship of the proleta-
riat." Similarly, Article 2, which provides that "[t]he Communist Party
is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people" and that "[t]he
guiding ideology of the People's Republic of China is Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong Thought" 59 was found to oblige the people to "up-
hold the leadership of the Communist Party of China" and to "uphold
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." These three quasi-consti-
tutional duties, together with the Article 56 duty to "support the social-
ist system" have come to be known as the "Four Principles." At
present, these "Principles" clearly limit the exercise of speech and pub-
lication rights.60
B. Democratic Rights and Political Theory
Chinese constitutional theory and practice, as described above, situ-
ate rights in a fluid context. The degree to which citizens may exercise
rights shifts in response to historical and social change, as well as to the
demands of duties, on a situation-by-situation basis. Chinese political
theory places rights in a framework in which their purpose is relatively
limited and the scope of their application-in the concrete sense of who
is entitled to use them-uncertain. The following discussion is intended
as an introduction to the basic elements of that theory.
1. Democratic Centralism (minzhujizhongzhi) and the Formation of
the Mass Line (qunzhong luxian)
The Chinese political system is one of "democratic centralism for the
55. XIANFA (Constitution) art. 56 (China).
56. Id. art. 57.
57. See J. SEYMOuR, supra note 3, at 7-21.
58. XIANFA (Constitution) art. I (China).
59. Id. art. 2.




people and dictatorship over class enemies."' 61 "Democratic central-
ism," perhaps an oxymoron, connotes a system in which the people are
autonomous to some degree in their economic decision-making and in
their personal lives, but not to a degree that infringes on the interests of
the people as a national collectivity. On the contrary, the ultimate aim
of democratic centralism being national unity of action, democracy is a
means to that unity and not an end in itself. The exercise of democratic
rights should, in the interests of centralism, strengthen social consensus,
and further the leaders' ability to lead, and the willingness of the led to
be led.
62
Chinese democratic centralism operates through the "formulation of
the mass line," a process that occupies a central role in Maoist political
theory. The mass line, as Mao described it, derives from the continu-
ous interplay of leadership and participation. Leaders take the ideas
expressed by the masses, extract from them what is valuable, and re-
turn with them to the masses who study them, grasp them, and trans-
late them into concrete practice.63 Such a process values political
expression primarily for the tangible gains it can bring about, not for its
own sake. Ideas expressed by the masses fuel the system; but, ulti-
mately, those ideas that are "incorrect" or "useless" will be thrown off,
as waste, in the course of the system's operation.
Democratic centralism thus is all that the term implies: a form of
government in which democracy and authority support and limit each
other. Like the related right/duty opposition, democracy/centralism
requires that any given exercise of rights occurs within the framework
of a dialectical process designed to determine whether that exercise is
valid and meaningful. Note, however, the dialectic's limitation. "Va-
61. See generaly MAo ZEDONG, supra note 16, at 83-90.
62. According to Mao,
[w]ithout democracy there can't be correct centralism because centralism can't be estab-
lished when people have divergent views and don't have unity of understanding. What
is meant by centralism? First, there must be a concentration of correct ideas. Unity of
understanding, policy; plan, command and action is attained on the basis of concentrat-
ing correct ideas. This is unity through centralism. ... Without democracy, without
ideas coming from the masses, it is impossible to formulate good lines, principles, poli-
cies or methods. As far as the formulation of lines, principles, policies and methods is
concerned, our leading organs merely play the role of a processing plant... . Unless
we fully promote people's democracy and inner-Party democracy and unless we fully
implement proletarian democracy, it will be impossible to have a high degree of cen-
tralism, and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to establish a socialist
economy.
Speech given by Mao Zedong at the Enlarged Working Conference of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (1962) (emphasis added). See also J. STARR, supra note 17, at 147-55 (1979).
63. See 3. STARR, supra note 17, at 147-51. Cf. F. ScHURMANN, supra note 4, at 54-55
(describing use of mass line concept in context of intra-Party democracy).
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lidity" and "meaning" are ultimately matters for unilateral decision.'
The authorities have the final word on which ideas are "correct."
2. Dictatorship Over Class Enemies
Influenced by the experience of the Soviet Union, China's Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary practice subjected the enemies and former op-
pressors of the people to the "dictatorship" of the proletariat who over-
threw them.64 In China, the concept of the "people's dictatorship" is a
central feature of political and constitutional theory.
6 5
The people, it is said, practice democracy among themselves and ex-
ercise "dictatorship over class enemies." This "dictatorship" takes the
form of the "suppression and punishment" of traitors, counterrevolu-
tionaries, and other "bad elements" and the deprivation, "according to
law," of the political and civil rights of other specified classes of peo-
ple.6 6 The appropriate objects of this suppression, punishment, and
deprivation change over time, in accordance with changing historical
and social conditions. 67 But change in the contents of the "enemy"
64. See generally V. LENIN, State and Revolution, in LENIN ON POLITICS AND REVOLU-
TION 184-230 (1968).
65. See XLANFA (Constitution) of 1954 (China); XIANFA (Constitution) of 1975, art. 1
(China); XIANFA (Constitution), art. I (China).
66. Article 18 of the Chinese Constitution provides, in part, that "[t]he state safeguards
the socialist system, suppresses all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities, punishes
all traitors and counter-revolutionaries, and punishes new-born bourgeois elements and
other bad elements."
Mao identified the purposes of the State in a similar manner.
What is this dictatorship for? Its first function is to suppress the reactionary classes and
elements and those exploiters in our country who range themselves against the socialist
revolution, to suppress all those who try to wreck our socialist revolution .... For
instance, to arrest, try and sentence certain counterrevolutionaries, and to deprive land-
lords and bureaucrat-capitalists of their right to vote and their freedom of speech for a
specified period of time--all this comes within the scope of our dictatorship.
MAO ZEDONG, supra note 16, at 83.
This view is reflected in the writing of other Chinese scholars.
In dealing with [class enemies], we must establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.
That is to say, we must deprive all class enemies of their political rights, including
freedom of speech. This indicates that freedom of speech in socialist society is similar
to that in capitalist society-neither is supraclass. The only difference is that in socialist
society, the majority uses dictatorship over the minority; and unlike the bourgeoisie, the
proletariat does not deny the class character of freedom of speech. On the contrary, it
explicitly declares that only the masses have the right to enjoy freedom of speech, not
the reactionary class nor the counterrevolutionaries.
Zhu, supra note 24, at L14.
67. This principle is reflected in the changes made by the 1978 Constitution.
As to the enforcement of proletariat dictatorship, the second [1975] Constitution calls
on the state to 'punish all traitors and counter-revolutionaries' and 'deprive the land-
lords, rich peasants, reactionary capitalists and other bad elements of political
rights... .' The new [1978] Constitution, while retaining 'all traitors and counter-
revolutionaries' has added 'new-born bourgeois elements and other bad elements.' This
has been dictated by developments. . . in recent years.
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category does not lessen the need to continue the struggle between the
"supraclasses" of "people" and "enemy." 68
The changing content of the category does, however, make the prac-
tice of dictatorship extremely difficult. By what criteria can a person be
adjudged to belong to a class that should be deprived of rights? Who
are the "counterrevolutionaries" deserving suppression and punish-
ment?69 The answer to this question goes to the core of the scope of
rights in China.
In sum, the Chinese concept of "right" is narrower than its western-
democratic counterpart. It refers, not to an inalienable power, but to a
limited form of freedom: the freedom, for most but not all of the peo-
ple, to participate in the political system in a prescribed way, and for a
particular purpose--the achievement of greater unanimity of action.
One might expect this narrow conception to possess the virtue of pre-
cision. But, as we have seen, this is not the case. At any given time, the
scope afforded these limited freedoms known as "rights" will be de-
fined in reference to the constitutional and political contexts in which
they are exercised. And because it is in the nature of such contexts to
change, so it is in the nature of these freedoms to expand and contract.
Unfortunately, a sudden contraction or an official determination that
a person has incorrectly evaluated the "context," can result in grave
sanctions for individuals who attempt to exercise their rights.
II. The Exercise of Rights and the Imposition of Sanctions
Numerous criminal and administrative sanctions, liable to discre-
tionary application, deter the vigorous exercise of rights in China.
A. Criminal Sanctions
The Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China (the "Criminal
Code") was promulgated in 1978 and adopted in 1979.70 It provides
He, Towards Rule by Law-Comments on the Characteristics of the 1978 Constitution, in
CilmNAs NEW DEMOCRACY 41 (Q. Xin. ed. 1979).
68. See generally .STARR, supra note 17, at 109-16.
69. Even Mao acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to tell who the counterrevolu-
tionaries are.
Successes were the main thing in our work of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, but
there were also mistakes. In some cases there were excesses and in others counter-
revolutionaries slipped through our net. Our policy is: 'Counter-revolutionaries must
be suppressed whenever found, mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered.'...
Wherever mistakes have been discovered.., steps have been or are being taken to'
correct them.
MAO ZEDONG, su~pra note 16, at 98-99.
70. ZHONGHUA RENmiN GoN HEGuO XiNoFA (1979) (China) [hereinafter cited as
XiNGFA]. This is the People's Republic of China's first comprehensive criminal code. For
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punishments for slander, disturbing the public order,71 and for the
counterrevolutionary crimes of plotting with foreign governments,
72
plotting to overthrow the state,73 revealing state secrets "to the enemy,"
spying, or working for "the enemy," 74 organizing counterrevolutionary
groups, 75 organizing or using religious organizations or superstitious
sects to carry out counterrevolutionary activity,76 and carrying out
counterrevolutionary incitement by disseminating counterrevolution-
ary literature, or by other means.
77
Broad or discretionary enforcement of these provisions may interfere
with the exercise of democratic rights. Given the provisions' vagueness
and generality, this result is likely. Because the Criminal Code is new
and has scarcely been tested, few limiting precedents exist. At least for
the time being, these categories of crime may remain fluid, and proba-
bly will respond to changes in the political climate.
1. Counterrevolutionary Crime
Especially subject to potential abuse is the category "counterrevolu-
tionary crime." The concept of "counterrevolutionary" cannot be sepa-
rated from the more inclusive "enemy" category of which it forms a
part.78 Because the latter category changes over time, so the character-
istics-of "counterrevolutionary activity" may never be subject to fixed
definition. Recent events demonstrate that political activities, permitted
and even sanctioned when they were undertaken, may be defined retro-
actively as "counterrevolutionary crimes."
79
Being designated a suspected counterrevolutionary has an uncertain
impact on the procedural treatment of an individual. Counterrevolu-
tionaries are to be "suppressed" as a class, "punished," and "deprived
of rights" by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Bringing counterrevo-
lutionary activity within the reach of a criminal code represents a step
an introduction to the Code and a discussion of its provisions, see The Criminal Research
Group, the Law Institute, .and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Lectures on the
Criminal Law, CHINESE LAw AND GovERNMENT, Summer, 1980, at 4-112.
71. XINGFA, arts. 138, 158-160.
72. Id. art. 91.
73. Id. art. 92.
74. Id. arts. 97(1), 97(3).
75. Id. art. 98.
76. Id. art. 99.
77. Id. art. 102.
78. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
79. During the recent trial of the "Gang of Four," Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's widow,
consistently maintained that the alleged counterrevolutionary acts were not only legal at the
time they were performed, but also that, in fact, "she had acted during the Cultural Revolu-
tion under the instruction of Mao and the Communist Party Central Committee." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1980, at A2, coL 3.
Vol. 7:287, 1981
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toward uniform adjudication of the cases of "counterrevolutionary ele-
ments." This change undoubtedly is welcome; during the Cultural
Revolution the extra-legal arrest, detention, and punishment of sup-
posed "counterrevolutionaries" were common occurrences,80 and the
scope of the term "counterrevolutionary" extended beyond all rational
limits. 8 ' But it is not reasonable to suppose that a neat legal definition
can readily replace such a political concept.
"Counterrevolutionary offense" is defined as "[a]ny act which jeop-
ardizes the People's Republic of China for the purpose of overthrowing
the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and overthrow-
ing the socialist system."8 2 Official commentators stress the importance
of specific intent; yet just what suffices to demonstrate the presence of
the requisite "purpose" remains unclear.
2. The Problem of Speech
Recent debates in the Chinese press over the definition of "counter-
revolutionary offense" reveal great uncertainty regarding the circum-
stances under which speech becomes a criminal act. According to
Chinese legal theory, "ideological offenses" do not exist. 83 Speech, be-
ing something more than ideology and something less than action,
poses a problem for the law. Although all commentators agree that the
principle, "[b]lame not the speaker" (yanzhe wu zu), should be given
effect, they also agree that, in some circumstances, one may cross the
boundary between non-actionable "speech" and actionable "conduct."
80. He, su.pra note 67, at 46 ("People could be put under arrest at will and held incom-
municado for investigation. During the wildest days of the Cultural Revolution, even physi-
cal tortures were used.")
81. This practice was particularly pronounced during the heyday of Lin Biao and the
'Gang of Four.' During that period,
some localities and units made counterrevolutionary many criminal offenses which es-
sentially do not belong to the category of counterrevolutionary crime, such as 'counter-
revolutionary rape,' 'counterrevolutionary theft,' 'counterrevolutionary corruption,' and
so on. This even reached to the extent where actions totally without counterrevolution-
ary objective, which had no harmful consequences to society, and which essentially did
not belong to the category of criminal conduct, for example, carelessly destroying a
leader's picture or such things, were elevated to the level of counterrevolutionary
offenses.
The Criminal Research Group, the Law Institute, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences, supra note 70, at 43.
82. XNiNFA art. 90.
83. According to one commentator on China's criminal system,
a person with reactionary thinking whose behavior and actions do not endanger society
cannot be considered to have committed an offense. China does not recognize 'ideolog-
ical offenses.' There is no stipulation in the criminal law for the punishment of an
'ideological offender.'
Cao, Questions and Answers, 23 BEuiNG REv. 18, 19 (1980) (discussing China's criminal
law).
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Until this boundary line is more clearly-and, to whatever extent possi-
ble, firmly-demarcated than it now is, the prospect of prosecution for
counterrevolutionary incitement, slander, or libel will continue to deter
substantial numbers of people from exercising speech rights.
8 4
3. The We Jingsheng Case
The Wei Jingsheng case demonstrates that the criminal law will in-
deed be used to "blame the speaker," and that, whatever the precise
definition of the permissible, an outspoken person may easily exceed it.
The trial and the surrounding events also demonstrate how "counter-
revolutionary crime" can be used to combat dissent, and how theoreti-
cal limitations on the citizens' exercise of democratic rights can
influence the determination of whether a counterrevolutionary crime
has been committed. One may say, therefore, that the Wei Jingsheng
case epitomizes the state of speech in China.
Wei was the editor of, and chief contributor to, the dissident journal
Exfplorations (Tansuo), which was founded during the brief period of
officially-sanctioned free expression that followed the downfall of the
Gang of Four.85 His essays and posters emphasized the need for a
"fifth modernization" in China-democracy 6-and described the Cul-
tural Revolution as having marked the defeat of the nation's demo-
cratic movement by the forces of tyranny.87 He characterized the
current Chinese system as "a feudal monarchy disguised as social-
ism,"88 described the process whereby Marxist revolutions give rise to
totalitarian states, 89 and clearly expressed his disdain for the current
leadership, asking "[a]re not the people justified in seizing power from
84. One writer has noted that the provision of positive legal safeguards for freedom of
speech would help to "eradicate the citizens' fears of being punished for their words." Yang,
Should Laws be Formulated to Safeguard Freedom of Speech?, 9 DEMOCRACY AND LAW,
supra note 31, at 5 (1980).
85. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
86. See generally Wei, The Ffth Modernization-Democracy and Its Alternatives, TAN-
SUO [EXPLORAnOINs] December, 1978, and January, 1979, translated and reprinted by Joint
Publications Research Service (copy on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
87. Some commentators have questioned the importance of democracy for the Chinese
people.
Is the struggle for democracy what the Chinese people really want? The Cultural
Revolution was the first occasion for them to demonstrate their strength, and all reac-
tionary forces trembled before them. Because the people had no clear orientation and
the democratic forces did not play the main role in the struggle, the majority of them
were brought over by the autocratic tyrants, led astray, divided, slandered and finally
violently suppressed. Thus these forces came to an end. The people then had a blind
faith in their leaders who were autocrats and careerists; therefore, they became a tool
and a sacrificial goat for the tyrants or potential tyrants.
Id. at 14.
88. Id. at 10.





Wei's posters first appeared on Democracy Wall in Beijing in late
1978. Publication of Explorations soon followed. The magazine circu-
lated in Beijing and the nearby city of Tianjin, and some of Wei's arti-
cles were reprinted and excerpted in foreign periodicals.91 Wei was
arrested on March 29, 1979, and tried on October 16. He was charged
with "supplying a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and car-
rying out counterrevolutionary incitement." 92
In support of the first charge, evidence was introduced to the effect
that, four days after the beginning of China's "battle of self-defense"
against Vietnam,93 Wei divulged to a foreign reporter the names of
Chinese commanders, the numbers of troops involved, and information
about battles and casualties. The content and distribution of Wei's
writings were cited in support of the second charge. Convicted on both
counts, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, to be followed by a
three-year deprivation of political rights. Both at home and abroad,
the sentence was criticized for its severity.
Many observers regarded Wei's trial as a show trial designed to sig-
nal the end of the "Beijing Spring." That it certainly was.94 In this
respect, Wei's case was an example of the ability of the authorities to
move an individual from the "people" to the "enemy" camp.
But the trial also established legal precedents. It revealed the author-
ities' understanding of what "speech" rises to the level of actionable
"conduct," and of what "conduct" is counterrevolutionary. The pres-
ent discussion is concerned chiefly with Wei's conviction for "counter-
revolutionary incitement." Chinese commentators also gave this aspect
90. Id. at 11.
91. Wei was said personally to have sold a subscription to his magazine to a foreign
reporter. q. A Philosopher vs. the System, ASlAWEEK, Nov. 2, 1979, at 14 ("Wei's articles
were reprinted by Chinese publications in Hongkong, translated and excerpted in other
languages.")
92. Wei was charged and tried after the National People's Congress had adopted the
new Criminal Code, see note 70 supra, but before it came into effect on January 1, 1980.
Accordingly, he was charged under the Regulations Regarding the Punishment of Counter-
revolutionaries (Chengzhifangeming tiaol), which had been in effect since 1951. See Tran-
script of Wei Trial, at 4 (copy on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order). But
neither the legal specialists' nor the authorities' commentary on the case has drawn a distinc-
tion between the definition of "counterrevolutionary crime," which was used to convict Wei,
and the definition applicable to adjudications under the Criminal Code. The discussion in
this Comment, therefore, assumes that the definition of "counterrevolutionary" generated by
the Wei decision is currently in force.
93. In February, 1979, China launched a military attack across the Sino-Vietnamese
border. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1979, at A3, coL 4.
94. "Wei Jingsheng's sentence to 15 years in prison was harsh but necessary 'to make an
example of him,' Deng Xiaoping said in an interview with Encyclopedia Britannica. Deng
... asserted that Wei was among a small group that tried to disrupt the democratic pro-
cess." Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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of Wei's case closest scrutiny. Although they did not ignore his convic-
tion for "revealing, military secrets to a foreigner," and occasionally
even criticized the reasoning behind that conviction, 95 Chinese inter-
preters and critics of the Wei decision focused on the nature of the
crime that Wei was found to have committed by expressing dissident
views. No one could overlook the fact that Wei and his writings had
figured prominently in the "Beijing Spring."
The constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and publication,
and the Chinese legal system's non-recognition of "ideological of-
fenses," provided the most important legal grounds for criticism of the
"counterrevolutionary incitement" conviction. The official explana-
tions of the case, of course, denied the validity of such criticisms.
Constitutional rights, the authorities pointed out, are limited by con-
stitutional duties. There is no such thing as a "right" that exceeds the
limitations imposed by those duties; and, in fact, conduct, which under
the claim of "right" violates those limitations, is reprehensible in and of
itself. Thus, the argument continued, in the case of speech and publica-
tion, the limitations embodied by the "Four Principles" are crucial to
determining whether a given utterance is entitled to Article 45 protec-
tion, or whether it is, on the contrary, unprotected and "reactionary."
A statement opposed to socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the Party, or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought falls in the lat-
ter category.
Such statements filled Wei's writings. Wei's judges emphasized his
failure to make the proper determination as to where "rights" end and
"duties" begin. They rebuked Wei for violating Articles 56 and 57 of
the Constitution96 and for failing to uphold the "Four Principles. '97
They repeatedly referred to his writings as "reactionary."
And, in the view of the authorities, Wei did more than make reac-
tionary statements; he "spread his reactionary ideas."98 Active dissemi-
nation made Wei's offense more than a mere "mistake of political
ideology." It is true, the authorities continued to maintain, that China's
legal system does not recognize "ideological offenses." No prosecution,
95. The conviction for "supplying of military intelligence" was criticized persuasively on
several grounds. It is questionable whether the information given to the foreigner was "se-
cret"; the Criminal Code (which presumably represents the legal standard by which Wei's
conduct was judged, see note 92 supra) refers only to supplying military intelligence to "the
enemy," XiGIFA art. 97(1), not to friendly or neutral foreigners; and, finally, the whole
charge was suspect insofar as no attempt was made to prosecute the person-presumably, a
member of the military-who revealed the "secrets" to Wei. See There were Ample Reasons
for Wei Jingsheng's Conviction and Sentence, Beijing Daily, Dec. 11, 1980.
96. See Prosecutor's Indictment, Transcript of Wei Trial, supra note 92, at 18.
97. Id.
98. See Taking Facts as the Foundation and Law as the Criterion, Workers' Daily, Nov. 9,
1979 (legal experts' forum discussion of Wei Jingsheng case).
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for example, could be based on a person's notes or diary entries be-
cause such writings lie within the scope of permissible expression of
individual "belief' (xinyang).99 But once an idea is made public, it has
social "consequences" that the law will not ignore.
A two-step analysis thus supported the court's finding that Wei Jing-
sheng had committed the crime of "counterrevolutionary incitement."
First, his statements were found to have been reactionary; and, second,
these reactionary statements were found to have been disseminated.
That Wei's writings offended the "Four Principles" apparently pro-
vided sufficient evidence of the "counterrevolutionary purpose" re-
quired by the Criminal Code's definition of "counterrevolutionary
crime."c "Jeopardy" was found in the "harmful social conse-
quences"101 of Wei's dissemination of reactionary literature.
This is a sorry precedent. The primitive reasoning of the decision
left open many more questions than it answered. Is there any distinc-
tion, for the purposes of a finding of "incitement," between harshly
critical language and exhortation to revolt?10 2 Is there any distinction,
for that matter, between spoken words, which are always in some sense
"public" acts with "social consequences," and written ones? Finally,
why did the court assume that constitutional "duties" take precedence
over constitutional "rights"? How is it, in other words, that the "Four
Principles" have subsumed the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and publication 0 3 and taken on the status of criminal prohibitions?
99. See There Were Ample Reasonsfor Wei Aingsheng's Conviction and Sentence, supra
note 95.
100. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
101. See Prosecutor's Indictment, Transcript of Wei Trial, supra note 92, at 4.
102. The Prosecutor's Indictment lists numerous examples of Wei's "reactionary" state-
ments. Some could be characterized as criticisms, and the others as exhortation. No clear
distinction, as to legal significance, was made between the two categories.
He did his utmost to libel Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a prescription
only slightly better than that peddled by charlatans, and slandered our socialist system
as an undemocratic and anti-democratic autocratic social system, calling it a 'feudal
monarchy disguised as socialism.' He brazenly raised a hue and cry, [saying] '[w]e
should concentrate our fury on the sinister system creating the tragic situation of our
people,' and arrogantly proposed that '[w]e should seize power from out of the hands of
these overlords.' He opposes the socialist system, and what kind of system does he want,
anyway? Whose power does he want to seize? Is it not extremely clear?
Id. at 18.
That many of Wei's statements were couched in clearly exhortative terms undoubtedly
made his an easy case. Precisely because it was so easy, it left no guidelines for deciding the
more difficult hypothetical case involving strong criticism, but no exhortation.
103. The Prosecutor asserted that
[e]very citizen's freedom of speech is a freedom which rests on the foundation of four
basic principles-support of the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the
leadership of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. There is only
freedom to defend that foundation: there is no freedom to destroy it.
Id. This view is echoed by other Chinese commentators.
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B. Administrative Sanctions
Wei Jingsheng's case was a vivid example of unpredictable, discre-
tionary application of criminal sanctions to activities arguably entitled
to constitutional protection. The citizens' awareness that the criminal
law can readily be put to such a use undoubtedly chills the exercise of
democratic rights. One would think that this chill chiefly affects those
citizens who desire to exercise their rights in relatively dramatic ways,
i.e., those citizens who can foresee that their expression of political
views, or involvement in political activity, might have a social impact
great enough to provoke the authorities' wrath. But to regard the crim-
inal law as the sole mechanism limiting the exercise of rights in China
ignores the reality of the Chinese social system.
The. criminal law is simply the outermost of a series of concentric
circles of social control surrounding the individual in China.'04 It is a
society in which surveillance is the norm, not the exception. Mutual
surveillance and control begin with the family and extend to the neigh-
borhoods, schools, work units, public security organs, and, finally, to
the legal authorities. The pressures exerted by all of these institutions
diminish the likelihood that any individual will express unorthodox
ideas, or, in fact, that an individual will develop such ideas in the first
place.105
This pervasive pressure to conform bears a complex relationship to
the exercise of democratic rights in China. But the focus of the present
[I]deas in opposition to the proletariat dictatorship, socialist road, the Party's leader-
ship, [and] Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought will not be allowed to be freely
aired in newspapers, magazines, books, radios, films or dramas, nor can these opinions
be freely spread through other means. If there are still people who insist on airing
them, the minor offenders will be criticized and educated. Serious offenders or people
who refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonition will be punished accord-
ingly. Do such practices encroach on the citizens' freedom of speech? No, they do not.
Zhu, supra note 24, at L15.
104. Cf. V. Li, supra note 20, at 39-53 (characterizing process of individual's transition
from normalcy to deviance in Chinese social context as "gradual slide," as opposed to "fall-
ing off the edge of a cliff' that occurs in the Western context, with both the "gradual slide"
and "concentric circle" images emphasizing the continuity and pervasiveness of social
control).
105. One of the important functions served by grassroots social institutions in China-
street committees, study groups, and others-is to catch incipient "contradictions" and re-
solve them before they become too fierce. Such contradictions include disputes between in-
dividuals, and institutional problems. They also include "contradictions" between
individuals and their environment. Persuasion (shuofu) by their peers and colleagues is used
as a means of winning over those individuals who express disagreements with Party policies
or dissatisfaction with their work. Small group institutions also serve as important conduits
for disseminating new policies. See generally id; Mitchell, Dispute Settlement in China, 4
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. SocmsS INT'L L. J. 71, 78-80 (1980).
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inquiry being tangible sanctions, discussion will be limited to the outer-
most source of pressure, the threat of "administrative punishment."
"Administrative penalties" constitute a loophole in the Chinese legal
system. These penalties, which are initiated and administered by the
local public security bureaus, include warnings, fines, detention, and
sentences to labor camps. The vagueness of the provisions defining "vi-
olations of public order" 106 and describing the classes of people who
deserve "labor education ' ' 10 7 ensure discretionary application. In prin-
ciple, a labor education committee or a people's court must approve a
sentence of labor education, or of the hardly distinguishable punish-
ments of forced labor or labor reform. In practice these punishments,
which may result in hard labor for periods of up to four years, often are
imposed without trial and with little or no judicial review. 10 8 The
number of people in forced labor camps may well rival the number of
those being held in more conventional prisons pursuant to criminal
convictions.'0 9
The prospect of such punishment threatens those who wish to engage
in behavior that might be deemed aberrant by a variety of authorities.
This possibility creates an impossible standard to satisfy. Yet--consti-
tutional theory aside-it may mark the actual limit of the scope of citi-
106. A "violation of public order" is defined as "[clonduct which disturbs public order,
harms public safety, infringes citizens' personal rights, or injures public or private property
which is relatively minor and, while not sufficient~ly serious] to be deserving of criminal
punishment, ought to be penalized in accordance with these regulations." ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHLAN GUANLI CHUFA TIAOLI (The People's Republic of China Regu-
lations Regarding Penalties [Used in] Administration of Public Order) (1957).
107. The "labor education" provisions are not unlike the "parasitism" laws of the Soviet
Union. Among the classes of people described as appropriate subjects for "labor education"
are people who exhibit "hooliganism," 'Jeopardize public order," "refuse to comply with
work assignments," or "continuously cause trouble for no reason," and "counterrevolution-
ary and reactionary elements opposed to socialism whose offenses are minor and to whom
no criminal responsibility has been assigned." GUOWUYUAN LAODONG JIAOYANG WENTI DE
JUEDING (Resolution of the State Council Regarding Labor Education) (1957) (reissued and
supplemented, 1979). Cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1980, at A3, col. 1 ("A middle-aged Commu-
nist Party member was recently arrested and sent to a labor reform camp for talking with an
American reporter. She was accused of divulging information about her personal life and
on sexual habits in China.")
108. Under a loophole in the law, authorities may imprison people for up to four years
without trial. Often these detainees are sent to the dreaded labor camps. The editor of one
unofficial journal committed suicide by jumping under a train that was to carry him to such
a camp. Seymour, Human Rights in China, SPEAHRHEAD, Winter, 1980-81, 1, 27 (excerpt
of testimony delivered before a joint session of two U.S. Congressional subcommittees).
109. , It has been estimated that as many as 9,000 persons are incarcerated in the forced
labor camps on the outskirts of Beijing alone. See China Revives Labor Camp System,
Wash. Post, June 1, 1980, at Al, col. 5. The number incarcerated throughout the whole of
China is estimated at approximately 100,000. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1981, at A4, col 3.
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zens' rights.' 10
III. Democratic Expression and the Future of Free Speech
At present, numerous theoretical and practical restrictions limit the
scope of the democratic rights enumerated in Article 45 of the Chinese
Constitution. The most important of these are:
1) the idea that rights are not inalienable or fixed but are subject to
modification in response to changing historical and social circumstances;
2) the principle of "the unity of the people's rights and duties;"
3) the nature of the society contemplated by the theory of democratic
centralism;
4) the fact that, under the people's democratic dictatorship, rights are
not universal;
5) the inhibitions that arise from the uncertain scope of China's crimi-
nal laws and from the fear of their discretionary application. "Counter-
revolutionary crime" is an especially troublesome category. The
definition of "counterrevolutionary" conduct changes over time, accord-
ing to who are the "revolutionaries" of the moment. The legal signifi-
cance of the term "counterrevolutionary" remains unclear;
6) the inhibitions arising from the close surveillance carried out at all
levels of Chinese society; and, particularly, from the public security or-
gans' surveillance of the citizenry and discretionary application of admin-
istrative sanctions. These sanctions, which can be quite harsh, are often
imposed with little or no supervision by the legal authorities.
One must distinguish those restrictions consistent with Chinese polit-
ical theory and with Chinese society from those that result merely from
the repressive application of legal sanctions or other methods of con-
trol. Insofar as Chinese political theory neither views rights as inalien-
110. The following passage from a Workers' Daily editorial evidences the haziness of
the dividing line between permissible and impermissible speech.
There are people who think that we should not stop or 'arrest' people who publicize
counterrevolutionary opinions. Instead, we should discuss and criticize them after-
wards. These ideas are basic violations of the provisions of 'the constitution' of our
country. Furthermore, China has stipulated various confidential regulations. Accord-
ing to provisions of these regulations, nobody should disclose confidential information
in conversation, letters, talks, or writings to outsiders. Offenders will be charged with
violation of criminal law. This is, in fact, a restriction on disclosing confidential infor-
mation. There is another restriction on freedom of speech and that is the restriction on
socialist morality. For example, 'we should not say things which are detrimental to the
unity of our country.' Offenses will be criticized and condemned by public opinion,
even though they are not punishable by law. Every conscientious socialist citizen
should not only spontaneously restrain his opinions and abide by the laws and regula-
tions of 'the constitution,' but should also measure himself against socialist morality
and restrain his opinions.
Zhu, supra note 24, at L15. Cf. Wang & Liu, On Unlimited Freedom of Speech, Beijing
Daily, Mar. 20, 1981, rerinted in DAILY REP., PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FBIS), Mar.
26, 1981, at Rl.
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able nor regards democratic expression as an end in itself, the scope of
democratic rights in China may well remain subject to modification in
light of other values. But how are those values to be defined, and how
are those definitions to be translated into cognizable limits? The future
of speech in China lies in the answers to these questions.
A. Three Paradigmsfor Democratic Participation
If it is in the nature of language' to retain the old while presenting
the new, it is particularly characteristic of Chinese political discourse to
effect radical changes in policy under the guise of maintaining earlier
priorities." 2 Any attempt to extract discrete paradigms for democratic
participation from the mass of available pronouncements thus is bound
to be somewhat artificial.
Nonetheless, bearing that caveat in mind, we may proceed to ex-
amine three paradigms whose interaction may determine the content of
permissible democratic expression in China, and the form of that ex-
pression. These paradigms derive from the political values of mass
participation, Party leadership, and what, for the purposes of this Com-
ment, I choose to call "due process.""
' 3
1. Mass Participation
As we saw in the discussion of the "mass line," 1 4 Chinese political
theory emphasizes political participation by the masses. Mass partici-
pation legitimates the political process and the role of leadership,"l 5
and is indispensable to democratic centralism."16
Viewed in light of the importance of mass participation, leadership is
a temporary and relative phenomenon." 7 If the masses determine that
their interests are not furthered by particular leaders or the policies
they pursue, they can, presumably, reject these leaders and revoke their
authority. In the past, the need for increased mass participation in the
111. "Language is at the same time a living thing and a museum of the fossils of life and
civilization." A. GRAMscI, THE MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS 113 (1957).
112. See Kraus, Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of SocialAnaosis in China, 69 CHINA
Q. 54, 74 (1977).
113. The analysis in this section draws on Leon S. Lipson's description of the "three-
cornered" nature of Soviet legality. See Lipson, Law andSociet, in PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET
SOCIETY 104-11 (A. Kassofed. 1968). But see V. Li, jupra note 20, at 23-31 (identifying only
two distinct approaches to law in China-that of the "legal specialists," on the one hand,
and that of the "communist cadres," on the other-and tracing the interaction of these two
approaches through the course of P.R.C. history).
114. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
115. See J. STARR, supra note 17, at 83; Liu & Niu, supra note 17.
116. See J. STApR, supra note 17, at 147-49, 151-52, 190-92.
117. Id. at 88-89.
313
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
political process has been said to justify the temporary relaxation of
rules and hierarchical structures, even at the risk of excess and chaos.'" 8
Some scholars have suggested that the Cultural Revolution was an
attempt by Mao and his followers to restore the primacy of mass partic-
ipation to a mileu in which the Party was becoming a political 6ite
divorced from its mass constituency." I9 Certainly, the mass media of
the Cultural Revolution period emphasized the importance of "un-
leashing the energy of the masses," and allowing them to air their
grievances against those in power.120 The "Four Bigs"-"new forms of
carrying on socialist revolution created by the masses"-were to serve
as the truly "mass" means for this reassertion of the peoples' authority.
The problem, of course, was that someone had to do the "un-
leashing," and someone had to call a halt to it. In view of the para-
doxes inherent in their leadership roles, 12' cadres and Party leaders
could not act simply as conduits for the energy and pent-up rage of the
masses; and they were in any case unlikely to do so when they were
themselves objects of criticism. 122 This experiment in mass democracy
quickly gave way to a situation in which freedom of exprssion was even
more limited than it had been before. The "mass line," originally con-
ceived to be a fluid political process, became a set of rigid normative
prescriptions used in the factional struggles of high Party officials. At
the same time, "bourgeois" notions of legality were repudiated, the
procuracy was weakened, and normal legal procedures were sus-
pended. As a result, the scope of speech rights was highly uncertain
and politically "safe" conduct severely restricted. 23 It is no wonder
then that, after the end of the supposedly "mass democratic" Great
118. The Land Reform of 1944-46 was one such occasion. See S. PEPPER, CIVIL WAR IN
CHINA 244-46, 269-73 (1978). After 1949, the Cultural Revolution has been the most promi-
nent instance of the "unleashing of the masses." See M. SELDEN, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 549-51, 584-85 (1979). See generalo V. Li, supra note 20, at 65.
119. See J. STARR, supra note 17, at 549-53.
120. See M. SELDEN, supra note 118, at 149-53.
121. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra.
122. During the tumultous Cultural Revolution,
the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques ... branded the great masses of
people's revolutionary opinions against the 'gang of four' and the expression of their
sentiment of mourning Premier Zhou as 'making counterrevolutionary speeches and
uttering counterrevolutionary slogans.' Under those circumstances, all kinds of epithets
were hurled at those who dared to speak their minds, at the very least, while in serious
cases, they were detained, resulting in many cases of miscarriage of justice. Many peo-
ple shut their mouths, kept their fury to themselves and dared not speak. Citizens were
totally deprived of their freedom of speech.
Li, Freedom of Speech Mfust Be Carried Out According to Law, People's Daily, Feb. 16, 1981,
refprinted in DAILY REP., PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FBIS), Feb. 17, 1981, at L4.
For vivid accounts of the repressive atmosphere that prevailed during the Cultural
Revolution, see CHEN JO-HsI, THE DEATH OF MAYOR YIN (1978) (short story collection).




Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a substantial number of Chinese re-
sponded with intense enthusiasm to the "Beijing Spring" and the
opportunity for officially-sanctioned freedom of expression.
The failures of the Cultural Revolution may prompt the Chinese to
revaluate the theory of the mass line. But it is doubtful that revaluation
will lead to rejection. The Chinese would be unlikely to acquiesce in a
form of political practice that effectively reads the "democracy" out of
democratic centralism.
2. Party Leadershp
The removal of the "Four Big Rights" from the Constitution repre-
sented the final stage in the dismantling of the Cultural Revolution ex-
periment in mass participation. That experiment, the *current
authorities maintain, yielded little besides chaos and a form of Party
leadership so oppressive as to deserve the name, "fascism." 124 In the
course of establishing their own "correct" version of Party leadership,
the authorities have, accordingly, deemphasized the value of mass par-
ticipation. To what extent this shift is temporary and aimed simply at a
restoration of order, and to what extent it represents an attempt funda-
mentally to redefine the relationship of the Party and the masses, is an
important question.
The role of the Party under Socialism is fraught with ambiguity. It is
the proletariat's spokesman, but also its vanguard. 125 It is the masses'
tool, but also their leader. It provides the conduit for, but also shapes
and refines the masses' ideas. The Maoist theory of the mass line re-
flects these paradoxes. Only through mass participation can the Party
legitimate its leadership, but it is only by itself deciding which ideas are
"correct" that the Party can formulate the mass line.126 The latter part
of the formula, combined with the lack of Party accountability to the
masses, poses a great threat to the egalitarian ideals of socialism. In-
deed, the theory of "embourgeoisement" holds that under such condi-
tions, the Party may insulate itself from criticism, entrench itself in
power, and become, essentially, a ruling 6lite.
127
If the Cultural Revolution was an attack on incipient embourgeoise-
124. See Z. JINFAN & Z. XIANYI, ZHONGGUO XIANFA SHILUE 13 (1979) (brief history of
China's Constitution) ("Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four'. . .turned the dictatorship of the
proletariat into a fascist dictatorship of the feudal comprador class.")
125. The constitution pithily embodies this paradox: "The Communist Party of China is
the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. The working class exercises leadershio
over the state through its vanguard, the Communist Pary of China." XtANFA (Constitution)
art. 2, para. 1 (China) (emphasis added). See also I. STARR, supra note 17, at 88-90.
126. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
127. See J. STARR, supra note 17, at 115-28.
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ment, 128 certain developments since the Cultural Revolution suggest
that the attack failed and that the feared process is proceeding apace.
With the 1975 Constitution, the Party elevated itself to a constitutional
status it had not theretofore enjoyed; 129 the recent enunciation of the
"Four Principles" grants the Party coequal status with socialism, Marx-
ism-Leninism, and Maoism. 130 In other words, the legitimacy of the
Party has become a fixed tenet of constitutional law and political
theory.
Recent discussion in the Chinese press indicates that the special sta-
tus of the Party is thought to justify the maintenance of two separate
systems of democracy: intra-Party. democracy and democracy for the
people. Within the Party, the unfettered discussion of views is permit-
ted, and is said to be indispensable to the Party's ability to explore poli-
cies and achieve consensus. The people, however, should hear only the
results of Party debates and evidence of intra-Party dissent should not
become public.1
31
As a corollary to this "dual democracy," there exists a dual system of
access to information and to the means of disseminating it. Special
publications containing detailed reports of domestic and international
events are available only to Party members, 132 and the Party dominates
the mass media as well as most printing facilities.133
128. Id. at 127. Cf. Wang & Liu, sufpra note 110, at R2 ("Some people ... claim that
there is a bureaucratic class within the Party and threaten to launch a second Great Cultural
Revolution.")
129. Article 2 of the 1975 Chinese Constitution, which is identical to Article 2 of the
present Constitution, see note 124 supra, lacked precedent in the 1954 Constitution.
130. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
131. See A Party Member's Statements and Actions Should Not Run Counter to Party
Policies, Beijing Daily, Feb. 6, 1980; Zhu, supra note 24, at L16. Party members were given
additional warning in the following ominous passage:
With regard to 'the citizens have freedom of speech,' the Constitution indeed does con-
tain this provision. However, one serving as a member of the Communist Party ought
not only abide by the Constitution, but should also, even more conscientiously, accept
the restraints of Party rules and regulations. Otherwise, how can he avoid confusing
himself with an ordinary civilian?
If There Are Dffering Opinions Regarding a [Party! Organization's Resolution, Wy Should
They Not Be Discussed with the Masses, Beijing Daily, Mar. 5, 1980.
132. CANKAO ZILIAO (Reference Material) is a well-known example of such publica-
tions. It is a detailed bulletin of foreign news reports that is available only to Party members
and officials. On the general question of differential access to information, see Butterfield,
Chinese Get Their News From a Hidden Network, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1980, at A3, col. 1.
133. Prominent Party officials candidly have admitted this domination.
Deng Xiaoping, in a major speech delivered to 10,000 party cadres at Beijing's Great
Hall of the People in January [1980], asked rhetorically why it was that 'certain secret
publications' were printed so beautifully. Noting that their authors could not possibly
possess printing plants, Deng concluded that the publications could not have appeared
without the support of party members.
Dreyer, supra note 46, at 62.




Of course, Party privilege is not a new thing in China. It existed
before the Cultural Revolution and persisted throughout the Cultural
Revolution in the face of savage attack.134 Arguably, Party members
should have some special status if they are to perform their leadership
roles in a flexible and effective manner.
But should the legitimacy of the Party be a tenet of constitutional
law? And-the presumption of consensus notwithstanding-should
the Party have the power unilaterally to modify the Constitution?
Should it be able to close its debates to the public and deliver its policy
decisions without advance warning to the individuals who will be af-
fected? In this latter regard, the events associated with the "Beijing
Spring" developments were significant, not only for the fact that they
allowed outsiders a rare glimpse at the aspirations of the Chinese peo-
ple, but also because they provided an example of what may happen
when Party "leadership" becomes unfettered Party authority. A Party
policy that encouraged the people to express their grievances gave way
to a contrary policy so quickly and dramatically that, within the course
of several months, speech permitted under the former policy became
actionable criminal conduct under the latter. Such inconsistency en-
genders social disorder in the short term135 and, in the long term, dis-
satisfaction with the government.1 36
3. Due Process
China's current leaders maintain that the events of the Cultural
Revolution demonstrated China's need for fixed legal procedures and a
The information media have been almost totally controlled by the successive groups in
power. The only exceptions were the independent wall posters... and the dissident
journals of 1978-79. The latter have now largely disappeared, and many of their editors
are now in prison. Today China's leading newspaper (and perhaps others) has author-
ity to publish articles without first clearing them with the Propaganda Department of
the Communist Party. This in itself does not make the press free, but it is an important
development nonetheless.
Seymour, supra note 108, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted).
134. In connection with this problem of stratification, see Butterfield, Chinafor a Fortu-
nate Few at the Top, Is Paradise ofPrivilege and Perquisites, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1981, at A6,
col. I.
135. See generaly Dreyer, supra note 46, at 54-65.
136. The Wei Jingsheng decision engendered significant public controversy, and seems,
to have provided the impetus for a spate of legal periodical articles discussing the need for
increased legal protection of speech rights. See, eg., note 145 and accompanying text infra.
Even as late as December, 1980, a year after the Wei decision was announced, a candidate
for election to a local people's congress made his disapproval of the decision the focal point
of his campaign. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1980, at A2, col. 3. Now that over two years
have passed since the decision and the Party has widely disseminated the "Four Principles"
guidelines for speech rights, see text accompanying notes 55-60 supra, public debate of the
Wei trial and related issues has virtually ceased. It is doubtful, however, that this silence
represents approval of the statur quo.
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comprehensive legal system. Accordingly, they have restored the
procuracy to its pre-Cultural Revolution status, drafted new laws, re-
furbished the legal profession, and launched a nationwide campaign of
legal education. 137
This support of the rule of law is without precedent in post-1949
China. Although the legal profession survived the establishment of the
People's Republic, the values it represents have long occupied a tenu-
ous position in the regime's political theory. The "Anti-Rightist" cam-
paign of 1957-58 explicitly rejected those values as "bourgeois," and
the Cultural Revolution, picking up where the Anti-Rightist campaign
left off, decimated the legal profession and the legal system as well.'
38
Against this background, the present authorities' seemingly unequivo-
cal support of "socialist legality" appears to be a new thing; an open
embrace of values that have previously been criticized and, from time
to time, rejected.
The sincerity of this embrace may be questioned. Recent events
have demonstrated the authorities' lack of concern for the separation of
law and politics. The rule of law has been used to suppress dissent and
punish political enemies. Such activities suggest that the authorities
contemplate only superficial adherence to the concept of legality.
But in contrast to this discouraging prospect, legal specialists in
China have begun to debate the meaning of the new laws and to sug-
gest lines of development for the new legal system. By drawing on the
ideas they have expressed and adding others that they have not ex-
plored, one may construct a "due process" paradigm for the exercise of
democratic rights.
a. The primacy of constitutional theory andpractice
Some writers have suggested that abandoning the "Four Principles"
concept would help to clarify the legal boundaries of speech rights.139
Such a development would be a positive step. The "Four Principles," a
recent creation,14° lack constitutional status; nor do they possess the
137. See Eliasoph & Grueneberg, supra note 9; Gelatt & Snyder, Legal Education in
China" Trainingfor a New Era, 1 CHiNA L. REP. 41 (1980).
138. See V. Li, supra note 20, at 30-31; Mitchell, supra note 105, at 77-78.
139. See Zhang, Should Legal Safeguards be Pro videdfor [the Principle ofi 'lame Not
the Speaker?", 9 DEMocRACY AND LAW, supra note 31, at 4 (1980) ("[p]rovided their con-
duct does not constitute the crimes of libel, slander, personal attack, incitement or disturbing
[public order] then, even if they harshly criticize Marxism, the Communist Party, or the
socialist system, [speakers] should not be given criminal punishment").
140. The "Four Principles" concept first appeared in 1979, apparently in response to the
"Beijing Spring" and also, perhaps, in response to the sudden increase in public disturbances
occasioned by the return to the cities of massive numbers of citizens who had been sent to
the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. See Dreyer, supra note 46, at 52-54. The
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status of formal prohibition represented by the criminal laws. Yet, as
the Wei Jingsheng trial demonstrated, these "Principles" can take on
the force of positive law. Moreover, nalaw protective of speech coun-
ters the requirement of adherence to the "Principles."
The only existing legal safeguards are the Constitution's Article 45
guaranties. Standing alone, these are inadequate to ensure the protec-
tion of speech rights. Recent history shows the authorities' tendency to
give content and force to constitutional provisions that enumerate the
people's duties, while relegating guaranties of citizens' rights to an in-
determinate status. Historically, constitutional "duties" have become
more onerous and more specific, while guaranties of democratic rights
have undergone no comparable expansion.
1 41
A satisfactory clarification of the relationship between the people's
rights and duties may require restoration of the wording of Article 56
to the form in which it appeared in the 1954 Constitution. That version
required only that citizens "abide by the Constitution and the law, up-
hold discipline at work, keep public order and respect social ethics. '142
This change would remove from the Constitution the duties of support
owed the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system, and
would thus facilitate freer discussion of the importance and nature of
th6se duties.
Given the problems associated with the Party's ability to accomplish
constitutional change by fiat, one might argue that, ideally, the people
should have the power to initiate, approve, or veto such change through
promulgation of the "Four Principles" did not end the uncertainty concerning the scope of
permissible speech.
At the same time that rebellion itself was outlawed, standards for dissent were clarified.
Four criteria were advanced.... Although the promulgation of these four criteria
was helpful in setting standards for dissent, the exact meaning of the four remained
ambiguous, for the government seemed to be redefining the meaning of each. In an
attempt to clarify just one of them, the party's newest heir-apparent, Zhao Ziyang, sug-
gested that socialism could be reduced to two principles: public ownership of the means
of production and payment to each according to his work. This fundamental reinter-
pretation of socialist doctrine... must surely have shocked those who had studied the
Marxist-Leninist classics and had learned the Maoist interpretation thereof only a few
years before.
Id. at 54 (footnotes omitted).
141. Duties appearing in the present Constitution that did not appear in the 1954 version
include, with the exception of the duty to "abide by the Constitution and the law," all of the
Article 56 duties, and the Article 57 duty to "safeguard state secrets." Note, however, that
the duty to "pay taxes according to law," see XIANFA (Constitution) of 1954, art. 102
(China), does not appear in the present Constitution.
As for rights, they had actually been diminished to some extent, even prior to the removal
of the "Four Bigs" from Article 45. See text accompanying note 149 infra. An exception to
this trend is the 1978 Constitution's Article 45 guaranty of the "freedom to strike," which did
not appear in the 1954 Constitution.
142. XIAN Fh(Constitution) of 1954, art. 100 (China). The content of this Article has
been split into two parts and incorporated into the current Articles 56 and 57.
319
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 7:287, 1981
fixed democratic procedures. The presumption of consensus, 143 a con-
cept which seems inconsistent with "mass line" principles, may ulti-
mately prove inadequate to satisfy developing standards of legality.144
b. New legislation
Exalting constitutional theory and practice, without more, would not
suffice to clarify the precise scope of the citizens' rights. As Chinese
commentators have pointed out, reliance solely on constitutional and
other general principles results in dependence on the winds of political
change.145 Freedom of speech and publication must have positive legal
safeguards. China should promulgate a publication law, and a law
protecting the exercise of speech rights. One might hope that these
laws would delineate the distinction between actionable "conduct" and
non-actionable "speech."
Whether or not such laws are adopted, the clarification of speech
rights requires resolution of the conduct/speech problem. As a stop-
gap, the promulgation of a law for the punishment of counterrevolu-
tionary agitation would serve a useful, though limited, function. Use of
the doctrine of current counterrevolutionary crime to punish what ap-
pear to be minor offenses has generated confusion and resentment. 146
If "counterrevolutionary crime" is to remain a category of offense,
143. See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
144. Indeed, the fact that the authorities had to strain to make the crimes fit the statute
may account for some of the peculiarities of the Wei Jingsheng case and the case of Fu
Yuehua, another dissident who was tried during the aftermath of the "Beijing Spring".
[Two leading dissidents were arrested. One of these, Wei Jingsheng, was accused of
giving military secrets to. . . foreigners .... The other, Fu Yuehua, had allegedly
accused her Party secretary falsely of rape. Noting that both of these charges had sur-
faced rather late in the proceedings against Wei and Fu, The Economist opined that the
accused had been singled out as examples for reasons other than those contained in the
formal charges.
Dreyer, supra note 46, at 57.
In other words, the authorities may have felt some pressure to present evidence of coun-
terrevolutionary "conduct" substantial enough to merit the severe punishment stipulated for
counterrevolutionary crimes.
145. The uncertain contours of proscribed speech clearly can be inhibiting.
Because "[b]lame not the speaker" is an abstract principle, it does not demarcate the
distinction between criminal and noncriminal; nor does it stipulate what legal responsi-
bility should be borne by an offender. The crucial point here is that the question of
whether a "speaker" has committed a crime is determined, not according to law, but
according to the "listener's attitude--which is unpredictable--and his heart..... [It is]
determined by the person who wields power. . . . Only laws safeguarding freedom of
speech make "speakers" and "listeners" equal before the law; and it is only when [such]
laws are powerful that people lose their fear of being punished for what they say.
Chen, Freedom o/Speech and Laws Protecting Freedom of Speech, 4 DEMOCRACY AND LAW,
supra note 31, at 19-20 (1979). Accord, The 'pri F#21h Forum' Story, supra note 34, at 21.
146. Apparently in response to a similar dilemma, the Soviet Union adopted the follow-
ing law in 1966, with the intention that it supplement, but by no means supplant, already-
existing laws punishing the commission of "state crimes."
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China should enact a law governing relatively minor "counterrevolu-
tionary" conduct, and prescribing correspondingly lighter penalties.147
Finally, were China to grant due process values their full weight, it
would adopt supplementary laws and procedures designed to make
practicable the citizens' constitutional rights to "lodge complaints...
against any person working in an organ of state, enterprise or institu-
tion for transgression of law or neglect of duty" and "to appeal to or-
gans of state at any level against any infringement of their rights.
' 148
Reinstitution of the 1954 Constitution's guaranty of a "right to com-
pensation" for "[p]eople suffering loss by reason of infringement by
persons working in organs of state of their rights as citizens" [sic]
149
would help these guaranties become something more than formal.
Conclusion
Each of the "mass activism," "Party leadership," and "due process"
EDICT AMENDING CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR, September 16, 1966.
[1966] Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, No. 38, item 1038.
Art. 190(1). The systematic distribution in oral form of deliberately false
fabrications harming the Soviet state and social structure, and also the preparation or
distribution in written, printed or other form of productions of such content shall be
punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years or by corrective
labor without deprivation of freedom for a term of up to one year or by fine of up to 100
rubles.
Art. 190(3). The organization or active participation in group activity seriously vio-
lating public order or accompanied by clearly illegally insubordinate demands on rep-
resentatives of authority or entailing disruption of the functioning of transport, state or
public agencies and enterprises shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term
of up to one year, or corrective labor without deprivation of freedom for a term of up to
one year, or by a fine up to 100 rubles.
Refprinted in J. HAZARD, THE SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM 88-89 (rev. ed. 1969).
147. A recent People's Daily article's reference to a 1955 "Decision on dealing with ille-
gal books and magazines"-a "decision" which has been in such obscurity that it was never
even mentioned in the Wei trial-indicates that the authorities are aware of the need for
such an intermediary law, and in fact have just such a law in mind.
[A]ccording to the 'decision on dealing will illegal books and magazines' pfssed by the
Standing Committee of the NPC on 8 November 1955, books and magazines having
any one of the following characteristics are considered illegal: 1) opposing the people's
democratic regime and violating existing policies, laws and regulations; 2) instigating
discrimination and oppression against certain nationalities or races and undermining
unity among all nationalities in the country; 3) obstructing diplomatic relations, oppos-
ing world peace and propagandizing imperialistic aggressive wars; 4) revealing state
secrets; 5) advocating theft, obscenity, murder, arson and other criminal acts, endan-
gering the people's health, undermining social morals and jeopardizing public order,
6) contravening the Constitution and laws and ordinances. Leading organs at various
levels can impose the penalties of stopping publication, stopping circulation, stopping
hiring out of and confiscation of the abovementioned publications, depending on the
circumstances of the legal violation. Until the state formulates new laws on this matter,
the above decision is still in effect.
Li, supra note 122, at L6.
148. XiANFA (Constitution) art. 55 (China).
149. XIANFA (Constitution) of 1954, art. 97 (China).
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paradigms for the exercise of democratic rights has the potential to sub-
sume the other two. But one might hope that extremism will be
avoided. Careful integration of the three paradigms could go far to-
ward achieving the Maoist vision of a "free but centralized, solemn yet
lively" (z oujizhong, yansu huopo) socialist society.
The adoption of due process safeguards for the exercise of rights is a
logical first step. Though such safeguards might ultimately prove un-
availing in the face of onslaught from "ultra-leftist" extremists or auto-
cratic Party bosses, their existence would at least pose an obstacle to
sudden and arbitrary suppressions of political rights. If speech and
publication doctrine were to develop and be consolidated through the
principled adjudication of individual cases, those doctrines would
prove more difficult to dismantle.
Such provision of basic safeguards for the exercise of rights could set
the stage for the much-needed discussion of fundamental theoretical
issues. Lively, open debates should address the meaning of the "mass
line" concept, the relationship between democracy and centralism, and
the work-style of the Party. But as long as speakers fear retribution for
their words, such debates will never take place.
Two overriding practical factors will ultimately determine the scope
of rights in China. The first is the problem of material limitations on
the exercise of rights. Socialist legal theory points out the hypocrisy of
granting people political rights while not providing material safeguards
for their exercise. In accordance with this insight, the 1954 Chinese
Constitution guaranteed to the citizens the "material facilities" neces-
sary to their enjoyment of democratic rights.So There are, undoubt-
edly, economic factors that account for the current leadership's failure
to restore this guaranty. Nonetheless, absent such a guaranty and the
resources to back it up, the "democratic rights" of China's impover-
ished citizens will remain empty words. 151
150. XIANFA (Constitution) of 1954, art. 87 (China).
151. TheAprilF'?h Forum, founded in 1978, was the first private newspaper to appear
in the People's Republic of China. The following excerpts from an interview with its editor
Xu Wenli testify to the economic obstacles faced by private citizens who wish to disseminate
their views.
Q: What equipment has your newspaper? How and where is it printed?
A: We are operating under very difficult conditions. Our office looks shabby, printing
equipment and methods are simple and primitive. Basically, we print by hand.
Q: How do you print it?
A: . . . [O]ur printing method is very primitive. We cut stencils first, and then have
them mimeographed by hand. We devote only our spare time and nights to printing the
newspaper.
Q: Where have the funds come from?




Finally, no matter what the explicit limitation on the exercise of
democratic rights-be it the present requirement of adherence to the
"Four Principles," or a "due process" requirement that the exercise of
speech rights not transgress the limitations laid down by an interlock-
ing set of laws--it will remain meaningless if it is not subject to uni-
form interpretation and enforcement. The chill created by the
arbitrary use of legal and administrative sanctions is in some ways
more injurious to democracy than the existence of the sanctions them-
selves. In this connection, one can only hope that the current authori-
ties' attempt to engraft legal principles and procedures in Chinese
society will succeed; that law will become a potent, independent social
force; and that the people will come to believe in it and rely on it.
whose monthly salaries range from 40 to 50 yuan [approximately U.S. $30.00 per
month]. Beginning from... issue no. 5, it has been sold at a price that all the low-
income Chinese people can afford. ... I have used one 16-square meter room as our
editorial department. It is where all the articles are edited, stencils are cut, copies are
printed and stapled .... Since we all have regular daytime jobs, we can only spend
nights running our newspaper. To meet the deadline, sometimes we can sleep only I to
4 hours a day.
The 'pril Fifth Forum' Story, supra note 34, at 24-25.
The fate that befell the April F#fth Forum is also a form of testimony.
In mid-1980, Xu Wenli's predecessor as April F#th Forum editor was sentenced to three
years imprisonment. At about the same time, Xu closed down the publication, perhaps
to avoid a similar fate. By September, all of Peking's unofficial journals had been
forced to cease publication.
Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
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